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CHAPTER 2
The Findings for 1950
THIS chapter presents and analyzes the findings for 1950 in terms of
the previously described measures related to the differential income
tax on net corporate earnings and the total income of stockholders.
With the findings for this one year the broad pattern of the differen-
tials can be laid out, and, in conjunction with this, a detailed explana-
tion of the methods used in the study illustrated by reference to
a particular body of data can be developed. Moreover, since the study
covers a number of years, estimates of the differential tax burden
for one of them will serve as a basis for comparative study of the
period as a whole and of selected years, and for an analysis of the
effect of changes in the variables that determine the degree of over- or
undertaxation. The year chosen, 1950, is the most recent for which
complete data were available when this analysis was in work. Chapter 3
deals with variations in the differentials and their characteristics in
several other years, and over the period 1940 through 1952 as a whole.
Chapter 7 analyzes the effect of the relief provisions introduced in 1954.
DIFFERENTIALS FOR 1950
How heavy was the differential taxation of net corporate earnings
and of stockholder income? What did the picture look like in 1950?
Chart 1 summarizes the answer in terms of the four selected measures.
The reader is reminded that the results are for "average" stockholders
representing the aggregate experience in each stockholder income class,
that the values plotted are those obtained from variant 2 of our stand-
ard measures, and that the income of stockholders includes their pro
rata share of pre-tax corporate earnings. The marginal rate schedules
for joint and separate returns showed substantial differences, except
at the two extremes of the income range, because of the income split-
ting permitted married stockholders. Therefore, the differentials for
each type of return were computed separately, and weighted averages
were struck for plotting the chart.
Examination of line 1—the difjerential against earnings for distribu-
tion—reveals that the double taxation of distributed earnings was
substantial but became steadily less severe as stockholder income rose.
At the bottom of the taxable stockholder income scale, earnings made
for distribution to stockholders were subject to a tax more than 34
percentage points higher than would have been due under the personal
29
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income tax alone. At the $25,000 stockholder income level the net
extra burden averaged about 29 percentage points, and at the top of
the stockholder income range plotted on the chart ($500,000) it was
only 10 per cent. The higher the stockholder income level the lower
the differential against earnings for distribution.
CHART1—Differentials, 1950
While the differential against earnings for retention (line 2) follows
the same general pattern, it is lower at all income levels, the difference
becoming very marked over the upper portion of the stockholder
income array. Starting at 30 per cent for the lowest income class, it
falls rapidly to only 15 per cent at the $25,000 mark, above which the
burden changes to a benefit increasing to a differential of —33 per
cent at the top of the stockholder income scale. At this level ($500,000)
the earnings for retention component of stockholders' income was
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Lers' income was
subject to a tax liability 33 percentage points less than would have
been the case had it been reached promptly and in full by the personal
income tax alone. It appears then, that on their share of earnings for
retention some stockholders were overtaxed and others were under.
taxed to significant degrees. The inversion from over- to undertaxation
occurred, on average, at just over the $50,000 stockholder income.
The weighted average of these two measures, the differential against
net corporate earnings, traces the same general path over the income
range as the differentials that comprise it, and falls between them
(line 3). Reflecting the greater absolute magnitude of earnings for
retention, it lies closer to line 2 than lineOver most of the income
scale the net corporate earnings component of stockholders' income
was overtaxed, but for stockholders higher up the income pyramid
undertaxation occurred. The heaviest extra burden lies on the lower
stockholder income levels($1,000 to $10,000)—between 82 and 29
percentage points. Above $10,000 the differential falls rapidly, reaching
0 at about $100,000 and a low point of —16 per cent at $500,000. Thus
the substantial over- or undertaxation found on net corporate earn-
ings depends on the stockholder's income level.
So far, by use of the first three measures, our inquiry has disclosed
that the net corporate earnings component of stockholder income
was subject to a tax differential, which means that total stockholder
income was either over- or undertaxed. How much heavier or lighter
was the effective tax rate for stockholders than the rate would have
been if their income (including their full pro rata share of net cor-
porate earnings) had been reached by the personal income tax alone?2
(The personal income tax is used as the benchmark in this connection
and for determining the other differentials also because it presumably
measures the community's consensus as to the rates of income taxa-
tion appropriate at different income levels.)
The answer is provided by the differential against stockholders' in-
come, line 4 on the chart. It appears that the majority of stockholders,
having incomes ranging from $1,000 to $50,000, were liable to an ap-
preciable extra income tax of from 6 to 10 percentage points. Those
most severely affected were in the income range between $10,000 and
$25,000 with a maximum differential of 10 points. But near the top of
the income scale a different picture emerges, with the differential de-
1In1950, earnings for distribution totaled $11 billion, earnings for retention $19
billion. (These figures are the totals for taxable stockholders only.)
2Anotherway of putting the question is this: How much heavier (or less onerous)
is the combined corporate-personal income tax rate on stockholders at a given in-
come level than the personal income tax on nonstockholders with a similar amount
of income?THE FINDINGS FOR 1950
dining very rapidly after the $50,000 point and reaching 0 at a little
over $100,000. Stockholders with incomes above this point enjoyed a
tax benefit that became relatively more important as income increased.
Thus, at the $500,000 imputed gross income level we find the com-
bined corporate-personal income tax liability to be 14 percentage
points lower than would have been the case without the corporate tax
and with stockholders' full pro rata share of net corporate earnings
subject only to the personal income tax.
Instead of falling constantly, as income rises, the differential against
stockholders tends first to increase over a portion of the income range
and then, after reaching a maximum between the $10,000 to $20,000
level, to fall constantly thereafter. Why this difference in behavior
compared with the other three differentials?It occurs because of
uneven variations in the proportion of imputed gross income that is
derived from corporate earnings. For the value of the differential
against stockholders is equal to that fraction of the differential against
net corporate earnings that net corporate earnings represent of im-
puted gross income. In general this fraction tends to rise with income.
(This is why we find the solid line on the chart lying closer to the
dashed line at the higher income levels.) Over the stockholder income
span from $6,000 to $20,000, the rise in the proportion of net corporate
earnings to imputed gross income more than compensates for the fall
in the differential against net corporate earnings, thereby causing the
product—the differential against stockholders—to rise over this range.
The findings apply to average stockholders and figures on how many
fell in the over- and undertaxed categories cannot be obtained directly
from these data. However, from a closely related set of procedures
(discussed in Chapter 6) we can get some idea of the number of stock-
holders in each of these categories. For 1950 the estimate is about
3.3 million double-taxed stockholders. Slightly under 3.2 million paid
a higher combined corporate-personal income tax than would have
been due under the personal income tax alone and were, in the sense
adopted here, overtaxed. On the other hand, some 4 per cent, about
130,000 were For the latter, a higher tax liability would
have occurred if the corporate tax had been eliminated and their
share of corporate earnings had been taxed in full as personal income.
While small as a proportion of all stockholders, the undertaxed group
3Theseestimates, while germane, are not strictly comparable with the variant 2
values of the differentials that have been used in discussing the findings for 1950. For
in deriving the number of over- and undertaxed stockholders, no account was taken
of the future capital gains tax liability on reinvested earnings of 1950. An adjust-
ment on this score would lead to somewhat larger overtaxed and smaller undertaxed
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THE FINDINGS FOR 1950
assumes greater importance when its share of all double-taxed net
corporate earnings is measured. Forty four per cent of net corporate
earnings was undertaxed.
The findings plotted in Chart 1are the averages for joint and
separate returns taken together. Table 3 shows how the differentials
varied with the type of return filed by stockholders at the same income
level. The differentials are higher for joint returns than for separate
returns, because the marginal rate schedule applying to married
persons who file jointly was lower than for separate returns over
most of the taxable income scale. For 1950, assuming the proportion
of separate to joint returns to be the same for stockholders as for all
taxpayers, it is estimated that about 786,000 taxable dividend recipients
filed separate returns, and about 2,511,000 filed joint returns.
The findings for 1950 are based on the tax treatment of corporate
earnings then in effect. With the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
modifications of the procedure for taxing dividends were introduced
—an exclusion of the first $50 of dividends ($100 for joint returns)
and a personal income tax credit equal to 4 per cent of dividends
over and above the amount excluded. How this dividend tax relief
would have changed the results for 1950 is considered in Chapter 7.
THE FINDINGS IN DETAIL
Up to this point the discussion has dealt with the findings, presented
directly with little elaboration. But the results are the offspring of
a long line of assumptions and choices between possible procedures.
A detailed discussion of how the findings were derived will serve to
point up the specific features of the selected method and to provide
a sense of the magnitudes involved. But it will do more. It will also
help the reader to a fuller understanding of our measures and their
limitations. The derivation of the differentials on joint returns for
1950 (which were over three-fourths of the total number of taxable
returns filed by stockholders) will be discussed with reference to the
data of Table 4•4
In column I are listed the nineteen "average" stockholder
levels selected as representing the whole range of stockholder
4 A similar set of computations was undertaken for separate returns in arriving
at the differentials discussed earlier in this chapter.
5 These same nineteen levels were used for every year in the period 1940-1952 (ex.
cept 1942 and 1943 for which the data necessary for our calculations were not tabu.
lated). Of course, there were stockholders with over $500,000 of imputed gross in.
come, but little would have been gained by adding several more income levels.
What happens at the top of the income range is indicated adequately by the
$500,000 stockholder income.
33THE FINDINGS FOR 1950
D
DERIVATION OF THE T
AVERAGECorporate
STOCK- earnings






























































an 040 an 0) 'C'0 an an an an an an oa —— —
aan o aD ao an C) r-(0—



















































Source: Basic data used [or
aDividendsfor each incom
ponent by 4.4158 which is thI
b The taxable income equiv
ble income to adjusted gross
in this column (and in the






income classes in 1
imputed gross incc
computed, class
in column 2 wereTHE FINDINGS FOR 1950
TABLE 4
Derivation of the Differentials, 1950
(joint returns)
DERIVATION OF THE TAXABLEINCOME EQUIVALENT OF ADJUSTED GROSSINCOME
AVERAGECorporate
stocK- earnings
HOLDER as a per Net Adjusted
IMPUTED cent of corporate gross
GROSS imputed earnings Other income Taxable















1 18.0% $180 $ 820 $41 $ 861
2 20.2 404 1,596 91 1,687 $ 304
3 20.9 627 2,373 142 2,515 601
4 18.9 756 3,244 171 3,415 1,124
5 19.5 975 4,025 221 4,246 1,711
6 19.4 1,164 4,836 264 5,100 2,438
8 30.9 2,472 5,528 560 6,088 3,330
10 34.8 3,480 6,520 788 7,308 4,348
12 36.0 4,320 7,680 978 8,658 5,532
15 37.6 5,640 9,360 1,277 10,637 7,308
20 42.3 8,460 11,540 1,916 13,456 9,890
25 46.2 11,550 13,450 2,616 16,066 12,403
50 59.7 29,850 20,150 6,760 26,910 22,281
75 68.2 51,150 23,850 11,583 35,433 30189
100 70.0 70,000 30,000 15,852 45,852 58,837
150 71.6 107,400 42,600 24,322 66,922 56,214
200 72.8 145,600 54,400 52,973 87,373 70,772
250 76.1 190,250 59,750 43,084 102,834 81,959
500 88.1 440,500 59,500 99,755 159,255 118,963
Source: Basic data used for computations from for 1950, Parts 1 and 2. Statistics of Income
aDividendsfor each income level were obtained by dividing the net corporate earnings com-
ponent by 4.4158 which is the 1950 ratio of net corporate earnings to dividends.
b Thetaxable income equivalent is derived by interpolation from a plot ofthe relation of taxa-
bleincome to adjusted grossincome,both as tabulated in Statisticsof Income. There is no entry
inthis column (and in the rest of the table) for the $1,000 average stockholder imputed gross
incomebecause it had no taxable income equivalent.(Table continues on next pages)
In this connection, all of net corporate earnings is taken to be the
measure of personal income from corporate activity. To obtain im-
puted gross income their pro rata share of corporate income taxes and
undistributed profits was added to stockholders' adjusted gross income
(which includes dividends), and stockholders were rearrayed in the
income classes in which they fell on imputation. The proportion of
imputed gross income accounted for by net corporate earnings was
computed, class averages were struck, and by interpolation the values
























HOLDER Corporation of personal Net extra Differential
IMPUTED income tax on income tax burden on against
GROSS earnings for applicable toearnings for Earnings for earnings for
INCOME distributionccorporate taxdistribu tiond distributione distributiont
(,g000's) (2) x0.1594 payment (8) x(9) (5) + (8)[(1O)÷ (11)]XlOO
(1) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2 $ 64 82.60% $ 53 $155 34.2%
3 100 82.60 83 242 34.3
4 121 82.60 100 292 34.2
5 155 82.60 128 376 34.0
6 186 82.60 154 450 342
8 394 82.60 325 954 34.1
10 555 79.98 444 1,343 33.1
12 689 79.98 551 1,667 33.1
15 899 79.09 711 2,176 32.7
20 1,949 76.34 1,030 3,265 31.5
25 1,842 72.70 1,339 4,458 30.0
50 4,759 62.51 2,975 11,519 25.8
75 8,155 54.32 4,430 19,738 22.4
100 11,161 47.85 5,841 27,013 19.8
150 17,124 42.09 7,208 41,446 17.4
200 23,215 37.33 8,665 56,188 15.4
250 30,334 33.92 10,288 -73,418 14.0
























o The multiplier was derived as follows: the dividend ratio of 0.369702 of after4ax earnings
of net income corporations multiplied by the tax proportion of 0.431270 of the income of deficit
and income corporations combined equals 0.1594, more precisely, 0.159441. Corporate income
tax on earnings for distribution, column 8, is the product of net corporate earnings (column 3)
and 0.159441. Seemingly roundabout, this procedure was more convenient in computation. It is
equivalent to applying a tax rate of 41.317 per cent to earnings for distribution.
d The extra burden on earnings for distribution is derived by multiplying the corporate tax
on earnings for distribution (column 8) by the complement of the relevant marginal rate(or
weighted average of marginal rates) of personal income tax at each income level (column 9).
The rates used in deriving column 9 are those that would apply to an increment of the amount
in column 8 to a taxable income of the size given in column 7.
eTheamount of earnings for distribution at each stockholder income level (column 11) can
be computed from the data in a number of ways, but 'most simply by adding dividends (column
5) and the corporate tax paid on this portion of corporate earnings (column 8).
C The difterential against earnings for distribution is derived by computing column 10 as a per
cent of column 11.
stockholder at each income level, and, therefore, represent the com-
posite of experience. In each imputed income class we have stock-
holders with varying amounts of adjusted gross income. For example,

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































THE FINDINGS FOR 1950
Table 4,continued




HOLDER Extra Differential stockholder
IMPUTED burden on against imputed
GROSS net corporate net Corporate gross
INCOME earnings earnings income
($000's) (10) + (27) [(29) ÷(3)]><100[(29) ÷(I)]x100
(I) (29) (30) (31)
2 $ 126 31.2% 6.3%
3 195 31.1 6.5
4 237 31.3 5.9
5 304 31.2 6.1
6 364 31.3 6.1
8 737 29.8 9.2
10 1.020 - 29.3 10.2
12 1,234 28.6 10.3
15 1,518 26.9 10.1
20 2,090 24.7 10.4
25 2,561 22.2 10.2
50 3,329 11.2 6.7
75 2,825 5.5 3.8
100 1,167 1.7 1.2
150 —4,012 —3.7 —2.7
200 —7.5
250 —19,978 —10.5 —8.0
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who formerly fell in adjusted gross income classes $600 and under
$1,000, $1,000 and under $1,500, $1,500 and under $2,000, $2,000 and
under $2,500, $2,500 and under $3,000, $3,000 and under $4,000,
$4,000 and under $5,000, $5,000 and under $7,000. After imputation
they are all in the same income class, but their imputed gross income
contains very different proportions of net corporate earnings. The
entries in column 2 come from interpolations based on the average
value in each class. Note that at the lower income levels the ratio of
net corporate earnings to imputed gross income is fairly constant,
hovering around 20 per cent. From about $8,000 on up, however, it
becomes a rapidly rising function of income size. At the top of the
income scale, on average, close to 90 per cent of stockholder total
income comes from this one source.
Columns 3 and 4 are obtained simply as indicated in the table. Net
corporate earnings were 4.4158 as large as dividends in 1950. The







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NET INCOME TAX SAVING
Net tax Net tax
AVERAGE Marginal saving as saving as
STOCK' rate of Potential a per cent a per cent
HOLDER personal personal Net income of net of
IMPUTED income tax income tax on tax saving on corporate stockholder
GROSS applicable to retained retained earnings income
INCOME retained earningsn earningso [(40) ÷ (3)][(40) ÷ (1)]
(,S000'S) earningsm (19) x(38) (39) —(26) x 100 x 100
(1) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42)
2 17.40% $24 $18 4.5 0.9
3 17.40 37 28 4.5 0.9
4 17.40 45 33 4.4 0.8
5 17.40 58 43 4.4 0.9
6 17.40 69 51 4.4 0.9
8 19.15 162 125 5.1 1.6
10 20.02 258 180 5.2 1.8
12 20.02 296 224 5.2 1.9
15 23.66 457 363 6.4 2.4
20 26.36 763 597 7.1 3.0
25 29.33 1,159 898 7.8 3.6
50 44.17 4,513 3,663 12.3 7.3
75 53.15 9,306 7,508 14.7 10.0
100 57.33 13,735 11,193 16.0 11.2
150 64.92 23,864 19,963 18.6 13.3
200 69.44 34,603 29,315 20.1 14.7
250 '72.95 47,506 40,595 21.3 16.2
500 81.82 123,362 107,362 24.4 21.5
m Themarginal rates of personal income tax that would be applicable (column 38) to retained
corporate earnings (column 19) considered as an increment to taxable income plus the corporate
tax on earnings for distribution (column 15).
The potential personal income tax liability on retained earnings was computed (column 39)
by multiplying retained corporate earnings (column 19)by the marginal rates of personal in.
come tax (column 38).
oFrom the potential personal income tax liability on retained earnings (column 39) was sub-
tracted the present value of the future capital gains tax liability on retained earnings (column
26) to arrive at the net income tax saving on reinvested earnings (column 40).
component of stockholders' income, column 5. Adding columns 4 and
5 furnishes column 6—the adjusted gross income component at each
average stockholder income level.
From the relation that obtained for all personal income taxpayers
was estimated the taxable income equivalent (for normal and surtax)
of stockholders' adjusted gross income (column 7). This furnished
the base from which to pick off the relevant marginal rates of personal
income tax. For, at every step we compare the actual tax liability with
41THE FINDINGS FOR 1950
the potential personal income tax liability, and this latter involves
increments to taxable income and the tax rates applicable to them.
Differential against Earnings for Distribution
In the first chapter the extra burden on earnings for distribution was
defined as the amount by which the corporate tax on earnings for
distribution exceeds the personal tax that would have been due on
an increment to taxable income equal in size to the corporate tax.
Tabulated in column 8 is the corporate tax on earnings for dis-
tribution, obtained by multiplying column 2 by 0.159441. This is a
roundabout method that minimized computing. Dividends comprised
0.369702 of after-tax earnings of net income corporations, while cor-
porate tax liability came to 0.431270 of the income of deficit and
income corporations combined. The product of these two ratios is
0.15944 1, which was applied directly to net corporate earnings to get
the corporate tax on earnings for distribution.
In effect, the corporate tax was allocated between dividends and
retained earnings to arrive at earnings for distribution and earnings
for retention on the basis of the relative weights of dividends and
retained earnings in the after-tax net income of income corporations.
But this procedure, which implicitly assumes that all earnings out of
which dividends were paid were subject to this year's corporate income
tax, appears open to question since some dividends were distributed
by deficit corporations, and, quite obviously out of earnings made
in prior years. Little distortion is introduced on this score, however,
for in 1950 less than 1 per cent of dividend payments were made by
deficit corporations. (Comparable percentages characterize the other
years of our study. In no case does the figure reach 3 per cent.) There-
fore, even with large variations in effective rates of income tax from
year to year, the earnings for distribution figure will be off to an
insignificant degree. For example, from 1949 to 1950 the effective rate
of corporate tax on earnings of income corporations rose by 7 per-
centage points—from 34.5 to 41.5. Yet if earnings for distribution had
been computed on the assumption that all dividends of deficit cor-
porations had been distributed from earnings taxed at the 1949 rate
(a more refined method) the estimate would differ from that of earn-
ings for distribution under the usual procedure by less than one-tenth
of one per cent. Not a very serious matter.
The extra burden on earnings for distribution can be written as
C6E —PCeE(where C6E equals the corporate tax and P the relevant
marginal rate of personal income tax) or CeE(1—P).In column 9
are listed the relevant I —Pfor increments the size of column 8 to
42
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each of the taxable incomes of column 7. The extra burden on earn-
ings for distribution appears in column 10. It is obtained by multi-
plying column 8 by column 9. The entries in column 10 indicate how
much more was taken from earnings made for distribution to stock-
holders because they were double taxed, than would have been due
if these earnings had been subject in full to the personal income tax
alone.
For a measure that permits comparability among income levels, the
absolute extra burden has been taken as a percentage of earnings for
distribution. The amount of earnings for distribution at each stock-
holder income level is found in column 11. It can be computed in
a number of ways, but most simply by adding columns 5 and 8.
Column 12—the differential against earnings for distribution—is
derived by dividing column 10 by column 11 and then multiplying
by 100. The evidence of column 12 is clear cut and At
every level of stockholder imputed gross income we find overtaxation
of earnings for distribution due to double taxation. Most worthy of
note is that, taken as an incremental effective rate (here called the
differential), the extra tax burden is a decreasing function of the size
of stockholder income. The higher the stockholder's income level,
the lower the additional effective rate of tax. In the discussion of
the conceptual framework of this analysis (see Chapter 1), the reason
for this relationship was given. In developing our formulas, it was
shown that the differential against the earnings for distribution com-
ponent of the income of stockholders is equal to C6 (1 —P),where
C6 is equal to the effective rate of corporate tax and P the marginal
rate of personal income tax that would have applied to a personal
income increment equal to the corporate tax on earnings for distribu-
tion. Since C6 is the same at all stockholder income levels and P rises
with income, (1 —P),the differential against earnings for dis-
tribution, is a declining function of stockholder income. The corpora-
tion income tax on the distributed portion of net corporate earnings
was most burdensome for those at the lower income levels, least
for those at the top of the income scale.(Stockholders
with income below the taxable minimum are omitted, but they would
be subject to the heaviest extra burden).
So much for the distributed segment of net corporate earnings.
What about the undistributed part?
Differential against Earnings for Retention
The earnings for retention component of net corporate earnings is
defined as the difference between net corporate earnings (column 3)
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and earnings for distribution (column 11). Tabulated in column 13,
earnings for retention equal net corporate savings plus that portion
of the corporate tax not allocated to dividends. In determining net
corporate saving, the losses of deficit corporations were subtracted
from the undistributed profits of net income corporations. In other
words, for purposes of our investigation, not only the pro rata share
of the earnings of corporations but also the proportionate share of
deficitsis imputed to stockholders in determining the amount of
personal income derived from corporate activity. In 1950, earnings
for retention were considerably greater than earnings for distribution;
the ratio of the former to the latter came to about 1.7.6
The corporate tax on earnings for retention, column 14, was ob-
tained by multiplying net corporate earnings (column 3) by 0.2718.
Use of this multiplier minimized the necessary calculations, and is
equivalent to applying a rate of 44.264 per cent to earnings for dis-
tribution. (See the explanation below the table.) .This is higher than
the effective rate of 41.317 per cent that was used in connection with
earnings for distribution.7 But this is as it should be. For the fraction
of the total corporate tax to be allocated to undistributed earnings
was determined on the basis of the data for net income corporations.
But in computing net undistributed earnings, which together with the
corporate tax component constitutes earnings for retention, the losses
of deficit corporations are subtracted from the retained earnings of
income corporations.
So far the actual corporate tax liability on earnings for retention
has been measured. To determine the extra burden the benchmark
figure—the potential personal income tax liability—must be computed.
Column 15 lists for each class the base from which to start this com-
putation—taxable income as defined for the personal income tax plus
the corporate tax on earnings for distribution. Then, considering
earnings for retention an addition to taxable income as tabulated in
column 15, the marginal rates of personal income tax that would have
applied are determined (column 16). Column 17, the potential per.
sonal income tax on for retention, is the product of columns
13 and 16. If the full amount of earnings for retention had been
distributed(or imputed to stockholders for personal income tax
purposes) these figures show the ensuing increase in personal income
tax liability.
6 In every year of our study except 1940 and 1941, earnings for retention exceeded
earnings for distribution.
Use of rounded figures causes the values in column 14 to diverge slightly from
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The difference between the actual corporate tax liability (column
14) and what would have been due under the personal income tax
(column 17) constitutes the current extra burden on earnings for reten-
tion (column 18). This extra burden can be (and in most years of the
study was) either positive or negative. For, depending on the stock-
holder's income level, the corporate rate will exceed the relevant per-
sonal marginal rate as in 1950 at incomes below $50,000, or fall short of
it as at higher income levels.8 Note that this is referred to as the current
extra burden, but there is an additional consideration concerning
the tax on earnings for retention.
INCREASED STOCK PRICES AND CAPITAL GAINS TAX ON STOCKHOLDERS RE-
SULTING FROM RETENTION OF EARNINGS
When corporations retain earnings and share prices rise as a result,
realization of this increment in value will lead to an increased capital
gains tax. Should this not be included in the tax load on earnings for
retention? The belief that it should leads to the question: how to
compute it? Merely to raise some of the more relevant questions
indicates the impossibility of arriving at even a fairly accurate answer.
By how much do share prices rise? To what extent are the gains
realized? How much of this realization is covered by taxable trans-
actions? Over how long a period do the gains accrue? With all these
imponderables involved, it should be clear that the figures in column
26 that constitute the estimated additional capital gains tax liability
are not precise. They are no more than illustrative. But they are not
misleading, for, while a number of arbitrary assumptions were made
in their derivation, none of the assumptions seems unreasonable. If,
at various points, a number of alternative assumptions had been
chosen, the same general picture would have emerged.9
More specifically, starting with undistributed earnings(after cor-
poration income taxes), the attempt was made to estimate:(1) to
what extent these retentions could be expected to increase the price
of stock; and (2) to what degree the personal income tax of stock-
holders would be increased because of the resulting realized capital
gains. To estimate(1), findings of the Cowles Commission study of
stock prices were used as the basis for assuming that 72 per cent of
such reinvestment would be reflected in share The procedures
S The exception is the one particular income level at which rates are equal.
9 A test incorporating a number of alternative assumptions is reported on below.
10 The 72 cents comes from a finding for the period 1870-1937 "that every $2.50 of
earnings retained by a corporation has, on the average, been associated with an in-
crease of $1.80 in the value of its stock." (Alfred Cowles 3rd and Associates, Corn.
mon Stock, Indexes1871-1937, Principia, 1938, p. 42.)
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for arriving at(2) were more complicated. Since not all of capital
gains are realized, and some realized gains are not taxable, it seemed
reasonable to suppose that only two-thirds of the potential gains
would show up on tax returns. It was assumed further that their
realization would not begin until under the tax law they would be
considered long-term gains, only half of which would be includible
in taxable income. Therefore 0.2412 (i.e., the product of 0.72 X0.67
X0.5)of retained earnings after corporation income tax was con-
sidered to be the relevant proportion of realized capital gains that
would show up on stockholders' tax returns. Further, it was supposed
that these gains would be realized over a period of five years, repre-
senting for each year increments to stockholder taxable income
(personal income tax definition) assumed to be the same as in 1950.
This provided the basis for computing the future increment to per.
sonal income tax liability attributable to the reinvested earnings of
1950. Then, with 5 per cent as a reasonable rate of return on alterna-
tive investment opportunities open to stockholders and as the relevant
rate for discounting, the present value of this future increment to
personal income tax liability was estimated.
For convenience in computation this present value correction(i.e.,
the present value would be 0.866 of the future value) was applied to
the proportion of realized capital gains estimated above as reported
for tax purposes—0.24l2. The result, 0.2089, was divided by 5, to
cover the assumed realization of these capital gains evenly over a
5 year period. This provided the multiplier—0.04 178—used in deriving
column 20 from the figures in column 19 which are the undistrib-
uted (reinvested) earnings, obtained by subtracting column 14 from
column 13. To these values was applied the multiplier 0.04178 to
obtain the annual present value of taxable realized capital gains
(under our assumptions) from 1951 through 1955. These figures com-
prise column 20.
On a further assumption—that stockholder taxable income from all
other sources (personal income tax definition) in all of these years
would be the same as in 1950—the marginal rate applicable in each
of these years to the capital gains increment was determined. These
rates are listed in columns 21 through 25. (The 50 per cent ceiling
in 1951, 1954, and 1955, and the 52 per cent maximum in 1952 and
1953 stem from the alternative tax option, open to taxpayers who
had net long-term capital gains.)
By multiplying the annual present value of taxable capital gains
(column 20) successively by the marginal rate for each of the next





income tax load o
Addition of co
present value of ii
extra burden on
capital gains tax 1
conclusion stands
tion can be posit
the stockholder. 1









column 27 by col
don of stockholdc
higher the differei





difference in the find
The extent of such
for the proportion of
lengths of time over













Changing the assuiTHE FINDINGS FOR 1950
estimates were obtained of the present value of the increased future
all of capital capital gains tax liability attributable to the reinvested earnings of
axable, it seemed 1950. This item, entered in column 26, constitutes an addition to the
potential gains income tax load on earnings for retention.
irther that their Addition of columns 18(the current extra burden) and 26(the
w theywould be present value of the additional future extra burden) furnishes the total
Lid be includible extra burden on earnings for retention(column 27). The future
ct of 0.72 )< 0.67 capital gains tax liability adjustment does not change the pattern; our
me tax was con- conclusion stands, viz., the total extra burden on earnings for reten-
apital gains that tion can be positive or negative depending on the income level of
it was supposed the stockholder. The higher the income level and the potential margi.
five years, repre- nal rate of personal income tax, the more likely a negative extra
taxable income burden. Thus, on average in 1950, the earnings for retention corn-
same as in 1950. ponent of incomes of married stockholders with over $50,000 of im-
ncrement to per. puted gross income was subject to a lower income tax liability than
ested earnings of would have been the case had it been reached by the personal income
eturn on alterna- tax alone. Below this income level the reverse was true.
as the relevant Again, for purposes of comparability among income classes the extra
ire increment to burden was computed relative to its base. The differential against
earnings for retention, entered in column 28 (equals the division of
correction(i.e., column 27 by column 13 expressed as a percent), is an inverse func-
was applied to don of stockholder income: the lower the income of stockholders, the
bove as reported higher the differential; after $50,000 for married taxpayers, the higher
livided by 5,to the income of stockholders, the more strongly negative the relative
is evenly over a extra burden on earnings for retention." Comparison of the results
-used in deriving
re the undistrib-
11Inconnection with the future capital gains tax liability adjustment, the reader's
suspicions are almost certain to be aroused by the number and breadth of the tin- column 14 from denying assumptions. Choice of other assumptions, however, would have made little
iplier 0.04 178 to difference in the findings.
The extent of such changes was tested by sample calculations using different ratios ed capital gains
for the proportion of capital gains realized in taxable form, and assuming differing hese figures corn- lengths of time over which they were realized. The results of the test, showing the
net extra burden on earnings for retention for the weighted average of joint and
income from all separate returns, 1950, are summarized in the table below:
Standard assumption Alternative assumption 11 of these years
)plicable in each Two-thirds One-third Three-fourths
Imputed of gain realized of gain realized of gain realized
termined. These in taxable form in taxable form in taxable form gross
per cent ceiling income level over over over over over
in 1952 and ($000s) 5 years 1 year10 years 1 year10 years
o taxpayers who 3 29.1% 28.1% 27.8% 29.6% 28.8%
6 29.4 28.2 28.0 29.8 29.1
12 25.7 24.5 24.2 26.2 25.7
ble capital gains 20 20.4 18.9 18.6 21.1 20.3
each of the next 200 —22.0 —24.7 —25.3 —20.7 —22.0
up the products, Changing the assumptions would, of course, change the results. But even strongly
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at the extremes of the stockholder income scale shows that, whereas
the average stockholder with $2,000 was subject to a tax liability on
the earnings for retention component of his income more than two
and one-half times the liability calculated by applying the rates of
the personal income tax alone, the actual corporate-personal tax at
the $500,000 average stockholder income level was about three-fifths
as high as the potential personal income tax liability on earnings for
retention. (Remember these data apply to stockholders who filed joint
returns.)
One further point will be mentioned now and elaborated later.
The findings just presented are a composite result influenced by both
corporation distribution policy and the corporation income tax. For
in determining the extra burden (or benefit) on earnings for reten-
tion there are two factors at work:(1) the tax saving due to non-
distribution;(2) the net burden of the corporation income tax. By
the tax saving due to nondistribution is meant the difference between
the personal income tax that would have been due had retained earn-
ings (column 19) been fully distributed and the present value of the
future capital gains tax on reinvested earnings (column 26). Even at
the lowest marginal rate bracket, the potential personal income tax
exceeds the future capital gains tax so there is always a tax saving,
and it becomes increasingly important as the marginal personal rate
that would have applied to retained earnings rises. The net corporate
tax burden, on the other hand, is always positive, but it declines in
degree as the level of stockholder income rises. For it is the amount
by which the actual corporate tax on earnings for retention exceeds
the personal tax that would have been due if stockholders had received
as personal income the sum paid as corporation income tax. With
(1) increasingly negative (i.e., if measured as a burden) and (2) de-
creasingly positive as income rises, the extra burden on earnings for
retention inevitably falls as average stockholder income rises and,
after a point, the burden usually turns to a tax saving.
Differential against Net Corporate Earnings
The extra burden on net corporate earnings tabulated in column 29
is the sum of the extra burden on each of the components of this
income share (column 10 plus column 27). Not all stockholders were
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On average, if the corporate tax were abolished and each stockholder's
pro rata share of corporate earnings were called fully and promptly
to account as part of personal income, those filing joint returns in
1950 would have been affected in either of two ways: stockholders
with imputed gross incomes below approximately $150,000 would have
paid lower taxes on their share of net corporate earnings; those with
incomes above $150,000 would have paid higher taxes on their share
of net corporate earnings.
How important was the extra burden or tax saving? It has been
measured as a proportion of both the net corporate earnings com-
ponent and stockholders' imputed gross income. In column 30 the
extra burden is tabulated as a percentage of stockholders' pro rata
share of net corporate earnings. The differential in this connection is
a weighted average of the differentiali against earnings for retention
and earnings for distribution. Like each ofits components, the
differential against net corporate earnings is a declining function of
the stockholder's income level. Further, after a point, the positive
differential against earnings for distribution is outweighed by the
negative differential against earnings for retention, leading to a differ.
ential in favor of net corporate earnings. Where along the income
scale this will occur depends on the relative weights of earnings for
retention and earnings for distribution. The heavier the weight of
earnings for retention, the more closely will the configurations of the
differential against net corporate earnings conform to the differential
against earnings for retention, bringing closer their turning points.
Because, however, the differential against earnings for distribution is
always positive, the turning point for net corporate earnings will come
at a higher income level than that for earnings for retention.
In summary, we find a substantial additional tax on the net cor-
porate earnings component of the majority of average stockholder
income levels, but near the top of the income range it is replaced by
a sizeable tax saving. Our method of taxing corporate earnings—at the
corporate level when earned and at the personal level when distributed
—led to a declining extra burden as the income level of stockholders
rose and at around $150,000 of imputed gross income it became a
benefit which continued to rise with income level.
Differential against Stockholders' Income
Column 31 presents the net extra burden as a rate on stockholders'
imputed gross income {(column29 -i-. column 1) X100],in effect, this
is a measure of the incremental tax rate to which stockholders were
subject. It shows us how much more heavily, in terms of effective rates,
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stockholders were taxed than would have been the case if, with the
corporate tax abolished, all their income including their full pro rata
share of net corporate earnings had been subject in full to the personal
income tax. By use of the personal income tax as the benchmark we
find, for example, that because of tax rates actually in effect on cor-
porate earnings the average married stockholder with $3,000 of im-
puted gross income was subject to a tax six and one-half percentage
points higher, and the average stockholder with $500,000 was taxed
at a rate some fourteen percentage points lower than the personal
income tax alone would have demanded.
How heavy the income tax differential against (or in favor of) stock-
holders will be depends on two things: (1) the differential against net
corporate earnings and; (2) the proportion of corporate earnings to im-
puted gross income. In specific terms, the values in column 31 are the
product of the differential against net corporate earnings (column 30)
and the percentage that net corporate earnings constitute of imputed
gross income (column 2); the values in column 31 are, therefore, always
lower than those in column 30. Moreover, the differential against
stockholders does not trace out precisely the same pattern as the differ-
ential against their pro rata share of net corporate earnings. The latter
declines continually as stockholder income rises; the former, however,
reading up the income scale, tends to rise up to a point ($12,000) and
then falls quite steadily. This difference in behavior is a, matter of
weighting, which requires brief explanation.
The differential against net corporate earnings, as previously noted,
is a weighted average of the differentials against earnings for distribu-
tion and earnings for retention. Because it was assumed that the same
dividends-to-corporate-earnings ratio applied in every one of our stock-
holder cells, the proportionate weights of earnings for dividends and
earnings for retention in net corporate earnings are the same at every
average stockholder income level. Since both component differentials
are declining functions of income, their weighted average will likewise
fall as income levels rise.
The same is not true, however, in the case of the differential against
stockholders, which is the differential against net corporate earnings
weighted by the proportion of corporate earnings to the whole of
stockholder income. For here the weights vary from one average stock-
holder income to another. The differential against net corporate earn-
ings falls continuously as income rises (with only minor exceptions),
while the ratio of net corporate earnings to imputed income behaves
irregularly up to the $6,000 stockholder income level and then rises
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$12,000, the fall in the differential against net corporate earnings is
less rapid than the rise in ratio of net corporate earnings to imputed
gross income; consequently, the differential against stockholders in-
creases from income level to income level. (Exceptions are from $3,000
to $4,000 where the ratio of net corporate earnings to imputed gross
income falls, and $5,000 to $6,000, where there is no change.) From
$12,000 up, the direction is reversed to a continuous fall in the differ-
ential (except the slight rise between $15,000 and $20,000).
Three Variants of the Differentials
Table 4 is designed to set forth in detail the procedures used in obtain-
ing the values of the differentials that seem most relevant for analyzing
the problem of the relative tax burden on stockholders. Therefore it
develops the derivation of what were designated in Chapter 1 as the
variant 2 values. However, by reference to the table, the differences
between our preferred measure and the two other possibilities,i.e.
variants 1 and 3, can be made explicit. In what follows, familiarity
with the discussion of the variants in Chapter 1is assumed.
In arriving at the variant 1 values we use the current extra burden
on earnings for retention (column 18) instead of the total extra burden
as listed in column 27. This leads to lower values for the differentials
against earnings for retention, net corporate earnings, and stock-
holders than those under variant 2.(It would also cause the entries
in column 40—the net income tax saving on corporate earnings—to
be higher than those tabulated, but calculations of variant values for
this measure were not undertaken.)
In computing variant 3, it will be recalled, an adjustment was made
for the failure of 28 cents of each reinvested dollar to show up as
capital gains. The present value of the addition to the "tax liability"
of stockholders in this connection comes to 0.2425 of the entries in
column 19—retained corporate earnings. In deriving the differentials
under variant 3, values this much higher than those in column 27—
total extra burden on earnings for retention—are used. Consequently
the variant S differentials against earnings for retention, net corporate
earnings, and stockholders are higher than as measured by our usual
procedure.
How different the values are under each of these variants can be
judged from the annual tables in Appendix A, and from Chart 2
which plots the 1950 data for joint and separate returns combined.
While differences do, of course, show up, the main conclusion is that
the basic income class pattern of all three variantsisthe same.
Therefore, although specific magnitudes would differ, the conclusions
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CHART 2—Three Variant Measures of the Differentials for 1950
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reached earlier by reference to variant 2 values would still be valid
no matter which of the variants was chosen.
Weighted Averages of Joint and Separate Returns
Separate calculations for stockholders filing joint returns and those
filing separate returns were necessary because different personal in-
come tax rates applied for each type of return. To arrive at a single
measure, averages were struck for the joint and separate return differ.
entials. The procedure here was straightforward. On the assumption
that the same proportion of joint to separate returns holds for stock-
holders as for all taxpayers, the proper weights were obtained for
application at each imputed gross income level. The weighted
ages, plotted on Chart I, are listed in Table 5.
TABLE 5










WEIGHTED AVERAGE DIFFERENTIALS" AGAINST:
Earnings Earnings Net Stockholder
LEVEL total for for corporate imputed
($000's) returns distribution retention earnings gross income
(1) (2) (3)a (4)a (5)a (6)a
1 0.& 34.3% 30.0% 31.7% 5.7%
2 19.1 34.2 29.3 31.2 6.3
3 44.6 34.3 29.1 81.1 6.5
4 66.1 33.9 28.7 30.7 5.8
5 76.9 33.8 28.8 30.7 6.0
6 83.2 34.0 28.7 30.8 6.0
8 83.9 33.7 26.5 29.8 9.0
10 84.3 32.9 26.0 28.6 9.9
12 85.1 32.7 24.6 27.7 10.0
15 86.4 32.1 22.0 25.9 9.7
20 86.9 30.8 18.5 23.3 9.8
25 87.2 29.2 15.2 20.6 9.5
50 87.6 24.9 0.4 10.0 5.9
75 87.1 21.7 —6.7 4.2 2.9
100 86.8 19.1 0.4 0.3
150 86.2 16.7 —18.7 —5.0 —3.6
200 85.6 14.6 —23.4 —8.7 —6.3
250 85.2 13.2 —26.9 —11.4 —8.7
500 83.8 10.0 —82.9 —16.3
a Derivation: column 2
separate returns.
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The Net Corporate Tax12 Distinguished from Other Factors
Up to now the objective of our analysis by a variety of measures based
on particular assumptions has been to pin point the results of our
system of taxing corporate earnings that involves an income tax on
the corporate level when earned and a tax on the personal level when
distributed in terms of the differential tax liability of stockholders.'3
In the procedure described above two factors influencing the results
—the corporate tax and corporate distribution policy—were not treated
separately. The findings so far are composite results in which the
effects of both factors are merged. It is useful for analytical purposes
to separate these two determinants to delineate more specifically the
net corporate tax and the personal income tax saving due to the failure
of corporations to distribute the whole of their annual earnings, and
analyze the role each plays in this set of interrelated factors. For this
purpose the net corporate tax has been measured very simply: it is
the difference between the corporate tax actually paid and the lia-
bility of stockholders if the sum paid as corporate income tax had
been subject instead to the personal income tax.
The computation of the net corporate tax on earnings for distribu-
tion has already been explained and appears as the extra burden on
income from this source (column 10 of Table 4). The derivation of
the rest of the net corporate tax is set forth in columns 32 through 35
of Table 4 with explanatory notes below the table. Had there been
either full distribution of corporate earnings or the requirement that
they be imputed fully to stockholders for personal income tax pur-
poses, that portion of earnings for retention which was paid as cor-
porate income tax would have served instead to enlarge the personal
tax base consisting of the stockholder's taxable adjusted gross income,
plus the corporate tax on earnings for distribution, plus net corporate
saving (retained earnings). This base appears in column 32, as the
sum of columns 15 and 19. Column 14 lists the corporate tax on
earnings for retention, and column 33 tabulates the complement of
the personal marginal rate that would apply to an increment (cor-
tax on earnings for retention) the size of column 14 to the
tax base in column 32. Column 34 (column 14 Xcolumn33) is the
net corporate tax on earnings for retention—the excess of the actual
corporate tax payment over what would have been due under the
personal income tax had the corporate tax been included as part of
12Thisphrase is taken from Goode, op. cit., p. 92. Our measure, however, differs
in several respects from his.
18Howour findings are affected by the dividend relief provisions introduced in
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is considered in Chapter 7.
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the stockholder's taxable income. Addition of the net corporate tax
on each of its components—earnings for distribution column 10, and
earnings for retention, column 34—furnishes the net corporate tax
on net corporate earnings, presented in column 35. The net corporate
tax has been converted to an effective rate on net corporate earnings
(column 36) and on all of stockholder income (column 37). Weighted
averages of these data for joint and separate returns are plotted on
Chart 3.
CHART3—Net Corporote Tax and Net Personal Income Tax Saving, 1950
As percentages of net corporate earnings
40
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Viewed in this light, the corporate tax, per se, constituted a sub-
stantial additional levy on stockholders' net corporate earnings—
ranging for joint returns from an extra tax of nearly 36 pcrcentage
points at the lower income levels to over 8 points at the $500,000 level.
A declining function of income, it fell steadily between these two ex-
55
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tremes. Considered in relation to all of a stockholder's income, the net Now wecor corporate tax, of course, represented a smaller but not an inconsider- guise:
able increase in effective rates. The corporate tax raised the rate of in- tax saving (wil
come taxation between 7 and 14 points higher than the rates at the same The net corpo:
income levels of the personal income tax alone. Here, however, no in relative mi1 steady decline is seen reading from low to high incomes, but rather (on the a pattern of rise followed by fall, with the values at the two extremes intersect) the of the income array about equal. The reasons for this pattern—varia- are undes-taxed tions in the rate of fall in net corporate tax on corporate earnings, Specifically
and in rise of corporate earnings as a per cent of imputed gross income note that the
—were discussed in connection with data in column 31, the differential (column 36) ar against stockholders. (column 41)e The reader is reminded that the net corporate tax neglects one (column 30). salient feature of the taxation of stockholders—their immunity from is equal to thes the current personal income tax liability on earnings retained by (column 37) an corporations. This results in a tax saving, even when the present value (column 42).'4 of future capital gains tax liability on retained earnings is taken into rounding.)
account. The net tax saving is estimated for 1950, in column 40. The
procedure consists of computing the potential personal income tax 14Asmentioned
on retained earnings (net of corporate income tax) and subtracting
from itthe future capital gainstax adjustment, previously de-
scribed. Individual steps in the procedure are set forth in columns 38
through 40.
Considering retained corporate earnings (column 19) as an incre-
ment to taxable adjusted gross income plus the corporate tax on
earnings for distribution (column 15), the marginal rate of personal
income tax that would have applied was determined. These rates
appear in column 38. Then column 39—the potential personal income
tax liability on retained earnings—was computed by multiplying
column 19 by column 38. From this the present value of the future
capital gains tax liability due to reinvested earnings was subtracted
(column 26), the result being the net income tax saving on retained
earnings (column 40). Finally, the tax saving was converted to a per-
centage of net corporate earnings(column 41) and stockholders
income (column 42). Weighted averages of these percentages for joint
and separate returns are plotted on Chart 3.
For both measures, it is no surprise to find the tax saving increasing
in relative importance as stockholder income rises. For example, the
estimated tax saving on this score increases from under 5 per cent
of corporate earnings and 1 per cent of stockholder income near the
bottom of the income scale, to 24 per cent of net corporate earnings
and 22 per cent of imputed gross income at the $500,000 income level.
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Now we come up against an old friend in a somewhat different
guise: addition of the percentages for the net corporate tax and the
tax saving (with its sign taken as negative) furnishes the differential.
The net corporate tax falls as income rises; the tax saving increases
in relative importance with income. Hence our finding that, after a
point (on the chart where the tax saving and net corporate tax lines
intersect) the tax saving outweighs the corporate tax—stockholders
are undertaxed.
Specifically with reference to the data of Table 4, the reader will
note that the algebraic sum of the net corporate tax percentage
(column 36) and the tax saving on net corporate earnings percentage
(column 41) equals the differential against net corporate earnings
(column 30). Also, the differential against stockholders (column 31)
is equal to the sum of the net corporate tax on stockholders percentage
(column 37) and the net tax saving percentage of stockholder income
(column (There will, of course, be slight differences due to
rounding.)
14Asmentioned earlier, in these summations the sign of the tax saving is negative.
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